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I. INTRODUCTION
It's a disturbing scenario--one that has occurred far too often in recent
years: A business owner operates a small business establishment for a number
of years. Perhaps later on, he involves a son, daughter, or significant other in
the business, while gradually scaling down his involvement in day to day
business operations. Through it all, however, the proprietor monitors business
operations on a regular basis and continues to have a voice in major business
decisions, if not the ultimate say so. Upon reaching age sixty-two or beyond, the
business owner decides that the time is right to begin receiving long-awaited
social security retirement benefits, paid into the system for most, if not all, of his
work life. However, because the business is ongoing, he no doubt desires to
continue to monitor the business as well as participate in important business
decisions. But, can he do so and preserve his right to receive retirement
benefits? Moreover, what result if social security retirement benefits are initiated
and it is thereafter determined that the worker's involvement in the business has
exceeded the bounds of "retirement" established by law? This article examines
statutory and regulatory provisions, rulings, and case law dealing with the above
issues and attempts to provide some measure of guidance to an area fraught with
uncertainty. In addition to examining social security retirement law, this article
considers the circumstances under which a self-employed individual or wage
earner may be compelled to reimburse the Secretary' for benefits erroneously
paid.
Attorneys, as private practitioners, should acquaint themselves with social
security retirement and overpayment law for a number of reasons. First,
eventually all clients will retire or semi-retire. As a client nears retirement age,
few things will be as important to him, from a financial standpoint, as preserving
his right to receive social security retirement benefits. If a client elects to allow
the business to continue operating into his retirement years, his attorney can play
a vital role by restructuring the business to allow for the client's limited
participation in business operations while maintaining the client's right to receive
much anticipated retirement benefits. Second, applications for retirement benefits
Copyright 1995, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Administrative Law Judge, Social Security Administration, Office of Hearings and Appeals.
1. The retirement insurance program, established under Title II of the Social Security Act, is
administered by the Social Security Administration, a branch of the Department of Health and Human
Services. Because the Secretary is the highest ranking official in the Department of Health and
Human Services, customarily the Social Security Administration, Department of Health and Human
Services is collectively referred to as "the Secretary." 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1988).
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are approved more times than not without an administrative hearing. This is
based in large part on the applicant's assertions as to his current and anticipated
level of work activity. The absences of administrative hearings increases the
likelihood of an erroneous award of benefits. This potential for erroneous
awards, coupled with the fact that the amount at issue in overpayment proceed-
ings instituted by the Secretary often ranges from $20,000 to $40,000, under-
scores the need for private practitioners to become well acquainted with social
security retirement and overpayment law. This article will provide attorneys with
a useful starting point when called upon to counsel or represent a client seeking
retirement benefits or when defending a claim of overpayment asserted by the
Secretary.
II. ESTABLISHING ENTITLEMENT TO RETIREMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS
Pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act (the Act), entitled "Federal
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits," Congress vested in the
Secretary the authority "to make rules and regulations and to establish proce-
dures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter."2 In addition, the
Act authorizes the Secretary "to make findings of fact, and decisions as to the
rights of any individual applying for a payment under this subchapter."3 Thus,
the Secretary is vested with both legislative and adjudicatory powers in
administering the benefit programs established under Title II of the Act.
Pursuant to such authority, the Secretary has enacted regulations and rulings4
which detail the administrative review process and articulate the circumstances
under which entitlement to benefits is established.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1988).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (1988).
4. While the Secretary's enacting of regulations and rulings could very well be the subject of
a separate article, in general, regulations issued by the Secretary are binding upon the courts. See
Schisler v. Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Judicial review of regulations promulgated
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) is narrow and limited to determining whether they are arbitrary,
capricious or in excess of the Secretary's statutory grant of authority."). Once a regulation survives
this rather limited judicial scrutiny, it is binding on the courts even if it represents a departure from
established case law. Id. at 568-69.
Social security rulings "represent precedent final opinions and orders and statements of policy and
interpretations that have been adopted" and are only binding on the Secretary's adjudicative
components. 20 C.F.R. § 422.406(b)(1) (1994). Hence, social security rulings are not binding on
the courts. Lauer v. Bowen, 818 F.2d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The Secretary has the
authority to issue rulings which are of limited geographical application. 20 C.F.R. § 404.985(b)
(1994) provides that where a:
United States Court of Appeals holding conflicts with our interpretation of a provision of
the Social Security Act or regulations ... we will issue a Social Security Acquiescence
Ruling that describes the administrative case and the court decision, identifies the issue(s)
involved, and explains how we will apply the holding, including, as necessary, how the
holding relates to other decisions within the applicable circuit.
Id. Thus, acquiescence rulings, unlike other rulings, only have circuit-wide application.
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To establish entitlement to retirement benefits, the worker must show (1) he
is age 62 or older' and (2) he has enough quarters of coverage to be fully
insured.' The burden of proof rests with the individual seeking benefits.' In
order to achieve fully insured status, the worker must have one quarter of
coverage for each calendar year after 1950 or, if later, for each calendar year
after the year the worker becomes age 21.8 A quarter of coverage is a basic unit
of coverage credited on the basis of the amount of earnings received by a worker
during a given period.9 If an individual, otherwise qualified to receive benefits
under the criteria noted above, continues to receive income attributable to work
activity, the regulations mandate certain deductions be made once earnings
exceed the applicable exempt amount.'0 Except in those instances hereafter
discussed, the exemptions that apply are the annual, not monthly, exempt
amounts provided in the regulations." The annual and, where applicable,
monthly exempt amounts for each calendar year are calculated in accordance
with a rather complex formula provided in the Act 2 and are published in the
Federal Register on or before November 1 of each year.'" For individuals who
have attained retirement age, excess earnings for taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1989, are thirty-three and one-third percent of all earnings which
5. 20 C.F.RL § 404.310(a) (1994).
6. 20 C.F.R. § 404.310(b) (1994).
7. 20 C.F.R. § 404.704 (1994).
8. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1 10(b)(2) (1994).
9. 20 C.F.R. § 404.140(a) (1994). 20 C.F.R. § 404.140(b) (1994) provides that for years prior
to 1978, quarters of coverage are credited on a quarterly, as opposed to annual, basis. Thus, if
earnings received during a quarter before the year 1978 exceed the amount necessary to establish a
quarter of coverage, the balance cannot be applied to another quarter. 20 C.F.R. § 404.140(c) (1994)
states that from 1978 onward, wages and self-employment income are credited on an annual basis,
and the worker is accordingly credited with a quarter of coverage for each part of his earnings in a
calendar year "that equals the amount required for a QC [quarter of coverage] in that year." 42
U.S.C. § 413(d)(1) (1988) provides that the amount of wages and self employment income necessary
to establish a quarter of coverage "shall be $250 in the calendar year 1978 and the amount
determined under paragraph (2) of this subsection for years after 1978." In addition to setting forth
the formula for computing quarters of coverage after 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 413(d)(2) (1988) requires the
Secretary to "publish in the Federal Register the amount of wages and self-employment income which
an individual must have in order to be credited with a quarter of coverage in the succeeding calendar
year." This figure has risen from $260 in 1979 to $630 in 1995. 43 Fed. Reg. 53,504 (1978); 59
Fed. Reg. 54,465 (1994).
10. Note, however, that workers age 70 or older are entitled to full retirement benefits
regardless of the amount of their earnings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.415(a) (1994).
11. 20 C.F.R. § 404.430(a)-(b) (1994).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 403(f)(8)(B) (1988). For individuals ages 65-69, the annual exempt amount
is $9,720 for 1991, $10,200 for 1992, $10,560 for 1993, $11,160 for 1994, and $11,280 for 1995.
For individuals ages 62-64, the annual exempt amount is $7,080 for 1991, $7,440 for 1992, $7,680
for 1993, $8,040 for 1994 and $8,160 for 1995. 56 Fed. Reg. 55,327 (1991); 58 Fed. Reg. 58,006
(1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 54, 467 (1994).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 403(f)(8)(A) (1988).
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are above the exempt amount.' For individuals of early retirement age as well
as retirement age individuals for taxable years beginning prior to December 31,
1989, excess earnings are fifty percent of all earnings above the applicable
exempt amount.'5
Excess earnings, computed as the above, reduce benefits on a dollar for
dollar basis. 6 Thus, $50 of excess earnings will reduce benefits by $50.
Excess earnings are charged to each month beginning with the first month of
entitlement and continuing to each subsequent month until all excess earnings
have been charged.'
7
While the annual exempt amounts are generally applicable, the worker is
given a break during the so-called "grace years." In a grace year, the monthly
exempt amounts provided in the regulations apply.'" Hence, the worker is
entitled to full retirement benefits for all months in which his earnings do not
exceed such amount.' Thus, the worker can draw full benefits during these
months, notwithstanding the fact that his annual earnings may ultimately exceed
the annual exempt amount. This grace period can prove to be a substantial
benefit, particularly during the individual's initial year of retirement. For
example, if an individual retires in April and his year-to-date earnings exceed the
annual exempt amount, he can nevertheless draw full benefits for the balance of
the year provided his monthly earnings during such period do not exceed the
monthly exempt amount. For wage earners applying for retirement benefits, the
first year, after entitlement is established," in which earnings fall below the
monthly exempt amount for at least one month is considered a grace year.2'
A self-employed individual is entitled to a grace year during the first year in
which he has not engaged in "substantial services" for at least one month.22 In
determining whether or not a self-employed individual has engaged in "substan-
tial services," the multi-factored test provided by the regulations is applied.23
Finally, the regulations provide that only income attributable to "significant
services" counts in determining one's entitlement to retirement benefits. 24
14. 20 C.F.R. § 404.430(a) (1994).
15. Id.
16. 20 C.F.R. § 404.434(b) (1994).
17. 20 C.F.R. § 404.434(a) (1994).
18. 20 C.F.R. § 404.430(b) (1994).
19. 20 C.F.R. § 404.435(a)(7) (1994).
20. See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text for explanation of how entitlement to
benefits is established.
21. 20 C.F.R. § 404.435(b)-(c) (1994).
22. 20 C.F.R. § 404.435(b)-(d) (1994).
23. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.446-404.447 (1994) provide that the following are the primary factors to
be considered in determining whether or not an individual is performing substantial services: (a) time
devoted to the business, (b) nature of services performed, (c) extent and nature of work activity
performed before the alleged date of retirement as compared with that performed subsequent thereto,
(d) presence or absence of an employee charged with the management of the business, (e) amount
of capital invested in the business, and (f) nature of the business as seasonal.
24. 20 C.F.R. § 404.429(b)(2)(ii) (1994).
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"Significant services" are defined by regulation as "any significant activity
performed by the individual in the operation or management of a trade,
profession, or business which can be related to the income received." 5 Section
404.429(b)(2)(ii) provides that the following activities are not considered to be
"significant services":
(1) Activities in connection with the selling of a product or crop
produced or created prior to the first month of benefit entitlement;
(2) Hiring an agent, manager or other employee to operate the
business;
(3) Signing contracts where the signature of the owner of the business
is required;
(4) Looking over the financial records to assess employee performance;
(5) Personally contacting old and valued customers in order to maintain
goodwill, provided such contact has a minimal effect on ongoing
business operations;
(6) Occasionally filling in for an agent or employee in an emergen-
cy.
26
Note, however, that the regulations establish a rebuttable presumption that
all income attributable to work activity is countable for purposes of determining
benefit entitlement.27
A. Income Shifting
A look at how the courts have handled questionable retirement issues will
facilitate a better synthesis of these concepts. In Gardner v. Hall,28 Hall, his
wife, and three adult children operated a family ranching business as a
partnership.29 While each partner owned a one-fifth interest in the business,
none of the partners drew a salary for services rendered. In December of 1960,
the business was incorporated, and each of the partners received one-fifth of the
issued stock. Hall assumed the position of president, his wife was appointed
secretary-treasurer, and their three sons were named as vice-presidents. While
Hall received no salary as president, his wife and three sons were each paid an
annual salary of $12,000 for duties performed as officers of the corporation. The
record reflects that after the business was incorporated, Hall worked approxi-
mately two to three hours per day, mostly giving advice to family members.
Hall's wife worked twice that amount. The evidence also establishes that Mrs.
Hall deposited her salary in a joint checking account maintained by her and her
25. Id.
26. 20 C.F.R. § 404.429(b)(2)(ii) (1994).
27. 20 C.F.R § 404.429(b)(2)(iii) (1994).
28. 366 F.2d 132 (10th Cir. 1966).
29. 366 F.2d at 133.
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husband and that some of the household expenses were paid from this ac-
count.3°
Hall's application for retirement benefits, filed after the business was
incorporated, was denied through the appeals council level.3' Subsequently,
however, the district court reversed, and the Secretary appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit.32 On appeal, the Secretary advanced two arguments in support of the
denial of benefits. First, the Secretary contended that since Hall devoted about
one-half as much time to the business as his wife, who received an annual salary
of $12,000, it was reasonable to assume that his services were worth at least
$6,000. Thus, reallocation of this amount to Hall extinguished any entitlement
to benefits during the period in question. Second, the Secretary maintained that
undistributed corporate profits of an unspecified sum, but presumably enough to
preclude benefit entitlement, should be allocated to Hall as reimbursement for
services performed in view of the fact that such income was, in large part,
attributable to his efforts.
In rejecting the Secretary's first argument, the Eleventh Circuit observed that
the Secretary unquestionably has the authority to vitiate fictitious salary
arrangements and reallocate wages between parties to reflect the realities of the
business.33 The court noted, however, that the Secretary can only exercise such
authority in situations in which the evidence establishes the existence of a
scheme of shifting wages from one party to another.3 4 Since no evidence in the
record suggested that Mrs. Hall or her three sons were not worthy of their
respective salaries, the court found that the evidence did not establish that wages
30. 366 F.2d at 134.
31. 366 F.2d at 133.
32. The administrative review process is initiated by the filing of an application for benefits.
At the first step of the review process, the Secretary's adjudicative component makes a determination
without a hearing. If the claim is denied, the aggrieved party has the right to request a reconsidera-
tion, at which time the Secretary reconsiders the original determination, again without hearing. The
third step in the process is the administrative law judge hearing. At this de novo, non-adversary
hearing, the applicant has the right to have an attorney or qualified non-attorney serve as a legal
representative. If the individual is dissatisfied with the administrative law judge's determination, he
may then request review by the Appeals Council, a centrally located appellate body responsible for
reviewing administrative law judge decisions for, among other things, abuse of discretion, error of
law, and error of fact. The Appeals Council will not disturb factual findings of the administrative
law judge if supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (1971). If the Appeals Council denies the request for review
or affirms the decision of the administrative law judge upon review, the decision becomes the final
decision of the Secretary, and the individual has sixty days to institute an action in federal district
court. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900-404.982 (1994). The district court will not overturn findings of fact
if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988). Unlike the Secretary's factual
findings, conclusions of law are subject to independent review by the district court and are therefore
not presumed valid. Smith v. Schweiker, 646 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1981).
33. 366 F.2d at 135.
34. Id.
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were improperly diverted or shifted by Hall to another individual. a5 This being
the case, the court held the Secretary had no authority to vitiate the corporation's
salary arrangements even though the value assigned by the Secretary to the
services rendered by Hall was supported by the evidence. 6 Finally, the court
summarily rejected the Secretary's contention that a portion of undistributed
corporate profits should be reclassified as wages and allotted to Hall. The court
noted that while the Internal Revenue Service has the authority to reclassify and
constructively allocate undistributed corporate income, the Secretary was not
vested with such plenary authority by Congress. 7 Thus, finding neither of the
Secretary's arguments submitted on appeal meritorious, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Hall.3"
Gardner left open the question of whether the Secretary has the authority to
reclassify distributed corporate profits as wages for purposes of determining
benefit entitlement. The Eighth Circuit, however, resolved this issue in favor of
the Secretary in Ludeking v. Finch.39 Ludeking challenged the Secretary's
authority to reclassify as wages dividends paid by a Subchapter S corporation,
contending that the exercise of such authority defeats the purposes of Subchapter
S of the Internal Revenue Code. The court made short work of this argument,
noting that the underlying purpose of Subchapter S is to allow business owners
to choose the protection of a corporate structure while avoiding what is often
perceived as prohibitive double taxation.4° Subchapter S, the court noted,
therefore deals with the treatment of income "and is not at all concerned with
what constitutes income, wages or salary under the Social Security Act."'
Hence, the policy considerations underlying the enactment of Subchapter S,
observed the Eighth Circuit, are in no way contravened by its recognition of the
Secretary's authority to reclassify dividend income as wages.42 Thus, the court
found that if, as here, a business owner has in fact received dividend income in
exchange for services rendered, and the dividend income is, therefore, in the
nature of disguised wages, the Secretary has the authority to reclassify dividends
as earned income for purposes of determining entitlement to retirement
benefits.4 Interestingly, the court also noted in dictum that under no circum-
stances does the Secretary have the authority to reclassify undistributed corporate
income as earned income for purposes of determining entitlement to retirement
benefits. Nevertheless, Ludeking goes a step beyond Gardner because Ludeking
holds that the authority of the Secretary to vitiate fictitious income arrangements
35. Id.
36. 366 F.2d at 135-36.
37. Id.
38. 366 F.2d at 136.
39. 421 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1970).
40. 421 F.2d at 503.
41. Id.
42. 421 F.2d at 503-04.
43. 421 F.2d at 503.
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is not limited to those situations in which a scheme of shifting wages is
established.
B. The Heer Factor
Heer v. Secretary of Health and Human Services" is an important Sixth
Circuit decision dealing with questionable retirement issues. Heer and his wife
were the only shareholders, directors, and officers of a closely held corporation.
From 1972 until his alleged retirement in 1978, Heer served as president and
secretary at an annual salary of $53,260, while his wife earned $26,630 as vice-
president and treasurer. Corporate minutes reflect that in November of 1977,
Heer's wife was elected to serve as president of the corporation at Heer's former
salary while Heer continued to serve as secretary without compensation. Four
months later, Heer filed an application for retirement benefits.45
In denying benefits, the Secretary pointed out that the salary received by
Heer's wife was his sole source of income and was undoubtedly used for his
support. The Secretary additionally noted that neither Heer's duties nor his
wife's duties had changed appreciably subsequent to their exchange of corporate
titles. Thus, the reasonable value of the services Mrs. Heer performed for the
corporation as president was the amount of her former salary; therefore the
balance should be allocated to Heer for purposes of determining benefit
entitlement. Because such allocation exceeded the maximum allowed by law,'
the Secretary determined that Heer was not entitled to retirement benefits."
In reviewing the Secretary's denial of benefits, the Sixth Circuit initially
recognized the authority of the Secretary, under the Act and the regulations, to
conduct a substance over form analysis of business transactions and relationships
for purposes of determining entitlement to retirement insurance benefits.4" The
court also agreed with the Secretary that the following are among "several"
factors to consider before piercing the veil of fictitious salary arrangements:
(1) Does the individual claiming benefits continue to contribute
substantial and valuable services to the corporation?
(2) Has a family member received an increase in salary with no
commensurate increase in duties?
(3) Is the income of such family member used to support the individual
claiming benefits? 9
44. 670 F.2d. 653 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
45. 670 F.2d at 654-55.
46. The terms "exempt amount" and "maximum allowed by law" have different meanings. The
"exempt amount" refers to the maximum amount of earnings an individual can receive without
incurring a reduction in benefits. Earnings are said to equal the "maximum allowed by law" when
they reduce benefit entitlement to zero.
47. 670 F.2d at 655.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Without making a specific finding regarding any of the factors noted above,
the court found the record supported the Secretary's determination that the
reduction in Heer's salary and contemporaneous increase in his wife's salary
constituted a fictitious salary arrangement.5" The court, therefore, affirmed the
Secretary's denial of bqnefits, finding the "reallocation" by the Secretary of
"part" of the wife's salary to Heer was justified."1
Importantly, however, the Heer court did not find that all three of the factors
discussed above must exist before the Secretary may vitiate a fictitious salary
arrangement. The Sixth Circuit simply stated these were three of "several"
factors to be considered before piercing the veil of unrepresentative salary
arrangements.
C. Conflicting Standards for Vitiating Salary Arrangements
As stated earlier, the Secretary will from time to time promulgate rulings
which are only binding on the Secretary's adjudicative components.52 In many
instances, the Secretary will simply adopt as a ruling a circuit court decision,
thus giving the decision nationwide application. The Secretary, in one such
instance, adopted the ruling of Berger v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services,53 promulgated as S.S.R. 88-12c. 4  In Berger, the Sixth Circuit
engaged in a well-thought out analysis of the applicable statutory and regulatory
provisions and ultimately concluded that benefit entitlement had not been estab-
lished. The facts revealed that Berger was originally awarded retirement benefits
in August of 1978 based on her assertion that she worked, and would continue
to work, only on weekends in a family-owned jewelry business. Thereafter, in
August of 1984, Berger went to the Social Security district office to seek an
increase in benefits. At that time, she completed a standard information form,
stating that she worked an average of fifty-one hours per week and further
asserting that her duties had not changed since 1978." 5
Upon receiving the above information, the Secretary determined that
although Berger had been paid a salary of only $50 per week from 1978 onward,
the actual value of the services she rendered to the business during this period
was in excess of the maximum allowed by law. The Secretary, therefore,
determined that Berger had erroneously been paid retirement benefits totalling
$29,458.90. The Secretary's initial determination of overpayment was appealed
by Berger, and the decision was affirmed on reconsideration. Subsequently, an
administrative law judge heard the case. The administrative law judge noted that
prior to her alleged retirement in 1978, Berger and her husband each earned
50. 670 F.2d at 655-56.
51. 670 F.2d at 656.
52. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
53. 835 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1987).
54. S.S.R. 88-12c (cum. Ed. 1988).
55. 835 F.2d at 637.
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approximately $20,800 per year. Immediately thereafter, however, Berger's
annual salary was reduced to a mere $2600 while her husband's salary was
increased to $80,000 per year, although the time devoted to the business and
duties performed by both parties never changed.56 Considering these facts, the
administrative law judge concluded Berger's services had a value of one-half of
the combined wages paid to her and her husband during the years 1978 through
1983."7 Because Berger's allocated earnings for these years extinguished any
right to retirement insurance benefits, the administrative law judge affirmed the
previous finding that she had been overpaid benefits totalling $29,458.90 during
the period in question.58
In reviewing the administrative law judge's decision, the court in Berger
recognized at the outset the right of the Secretary to examine the substance of
business transactions in order to determine if the individual claiming benefits is
in fact retired under the Act and regulations.59 In valuing services performed,
the court noted that consideration must be given to the following factors:
(1) time devoted to the business;
(2) nature of services rendered;
(3) comparison of extent and nature of activity performed before and
after the alleged date of retirement;
(4) presence of an adequately qualified paid individual managing the
business (in place of the individual alleging retirement);
(5) type of business involved;
(6) amount of capital invested in the business;
(7) seasonal nature of the business.'e
Having said this, the court held, after carefully reviewing the record, that
substantial evidence did not support the administrative law judge's determination
that the services rendered by Berger and her husband during the years in question
were of equal value.61 The court noted Berger's husband was the manager and
the driving force of the business. Consequently, his services were clearly of
greater value than those performed by his wife.62 Nevertheless, the court
concluded Berger's services were assuredly worth at least one-fourth of the
combined income of such parties, considering her efforts in sales, supervision,
and management. The court, therefore, allocated earnings in this amount to
56. 835 F.2d at 637-38.
57. These values were $51,600 in 1978, $41,600 in 1979, $41,600 in 1980, $50,000 in 1981,
$52,900 in 1982, and $55,400 in 1983. 835 F.2d at 638.
58. 835 F.2d at 638.
59. 835 F.2d at 639.
60. Id. The court "borrowed" these factors from 20 C.F.R. § 404.446(a) (1994) which, as
previously noted, only applies where entitlement to a grace year is at issue. See supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Berger for purposes of determining benefit entitlement 3 Because Berger's
allocated earnings exceeded the maximum allowed by law during the period in
question, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Secretary's conclusion that Berger was
not entitled to retirement benefits during the years 1978-1983 and affirmed the
Secretary's resultant determination of overpayment.'
In affirming the Secretary's determination of overpayment, the court rejected
two rather interesting procedural arguments raised by Berger. First, Berger
contended the administrative review process was unfair because the 1984
information form she executed in connection with a request for increased benefits
was used against her to assess the overpayment without prior warning. In
resolving this issue in favor of the Secretary, the court noted that because Berger
had voluntarily entered the social security office seeking an increase in benefits,
the Secretary was authorized to elicit all information necessary to process the
request." As for Berger's contention that prior notice of the form's potential
use should have been given, the court determined the Secretary was "under no
obligation to warn Mrs. Berger that her admissions might be used to determine
that she was not retired during the years she claimed she was."" In so holding,
the court essentially rejected the notion that the administrative review process
was a quasi-criminal proceeding mandating something in the nature of a Miranda
warning prior to eliciting relevant information in connection with a claim for
benefits. Second, Berger contended she was denied due process because the
administrative law judge rejected her request to subpoena the employee who
initially assessed the overpayment on behalf of the Social Security Administra-
tion. The court disagreed, finding the determination as to whether a subpoena
is reasonably necessary is reserved by regulation67 to the administrative law
judge, and such a procedure does not violate due process.68
63. 835 F.2d at 639-40.
64. 835 F.2d at 640-41.
65. 835 F.2d at 640.
66. Id.
67. 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d) (1994) provides when "reasonably necessary," the administrative
law judge may issue a subpoena for the appearance and testimony of witnesses or production of
books, papers, or other documents.
68. 835 F.2d at 640-41. This finding is questionable in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (1971). The court in Perales held that in a
Title II claim for disability insurance benefits, due process mandates that the benefit applicant be
afforded the right to cross examine physicians whose reports are to be considered by an administra-
tive law judge in determining the issue of disability. Id. at 409-10, 91 S. Ct. at 1431-32. See also
Lidy v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 959, 111 S. Ct. 2274 (1991).
The findings made at the initial and reconsideration levels of the administrative review process in
overpayment proceedings are considered as evidence the same as reports submitted by examining or
treating physicians in Title H disability claims. One might therefore argue that the right to cross
examine employees of the Social Security Administration involved in the decision making process
in an overpayment proceeding is analogous to the right to confront and examine reporting physicians
in Title II claims for disability insurance benefits.
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In Martin v. Sullivan,69 adopted by the Secretary as S.S.R. 91-1c,7"
Martin worked as a self-employed musician, and his wife handled the clerical
aspects of the business. Martin did not dispute that in September of 1982 he
incorporated the business for the specific purpose of obtaining retirement
insurance benefits. Martin was named as president of the corporation, while his
wife was named secretary-treasurer. Martin and his wife each were issued one-
half of the corporate stock, and both were appointed to serve on the board of
directors. However, the duties performed by Martin and his wife did not change
after the business was incorporated.
In his original application for retirement benefits filed in September of 1983,
Martin claimed he would be "retired" as of January 1, 1984."' He asserted that
as of such date his monthly earnings would be reduced to $430 per month.
Although he would continue to make all major business decisions, the amount
of time he planned to devote to the business would decrease significantly.
Martin also claimed that, as of such date, his wife would handle bookings but
that he would retain the right to accept or reject all engagements. Despite these
assertions, the Secretary denied Martin's application for benefits in October of
1983, finding that the record did not support his claim of "anticipated retire-
ment." No appeal was filed. Martin, however, filed a second application for
benefits in January of 1984 which was denied both initially and on reconsidera-
tion. Martin then requested an administrative law judge hearing and amended
his alleged onset of retirement to January 1, 1985. At the administrative law
judge hearing, Martin acknowledged that he continued to manage the business,
which included making major business decisions and setting salaries, and stated
the amount of time he spent performing such duties ranged from five to ten
hours per week.72 However, in addition to the time spent managing the
business, he stated that he played music approximately twenty-five to thirty hours
per month. He further stated that even after the business was incorporated in
1982, his wife's duties continued to be primarily clerical in nature. Fiscal year
1983 records revealed gross receipts of $236,742, with Martin receiving wages
totalling $7,200 while his wife was paid a salary of $16,800. Records for fiscal
year 1984 revealed gross receipts of $213,142 with an annual salary of $4,050
being paid to Martin and $9,250 being paid to Martin's wife.
Relying on Sections 404.704-.709, the Eleventh Circuit correctly noted that
in questionable retirement cases, the burden of proof rests with the individual
claiming entitlement to benefits, and accordingly, such person must demonstrate
that his earnings do not exceed the maximum allowed by law.73 The court also
emphasized that the adjudicator must closely scrutinize the affairs of a family
operated business when it is evident that the business has been restructured for
69. 894 F.2d 1520 (1 lth Cir. 1990).
70. S.S.R. 91-1c (cum. Ed. 1990-91).
71. 894 F.2d at 1522.
72. 894 F.2d at 1525.
73. 894 F.2d at 1531-32.
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the express purpose of obtaining retirement insurance benefits.74 Turning its
attention to the facts of the case, the court concluded the following findings of
the Secretary were supported by substantial evidence:
A. That Mrs. Martin's duties remained unchanged since the business
was incorporated in 1982 and it was therefore clear that the increases
in salary received by her were not attributable to an increase in duties
performed.73
B. That Mrs. Martin's salary was undoubtedly used to provide for
Martin's support.76
C. That at all times pertinent hereto, Martin retained "active control"
of the business and thus, he continued to be significantly involved in the
affairs of the business subsequent to his alleged retirement.
77
D. That the compensation received by Martin was not representative of
the services he rendered to the business.7"
In view of these findings, the court concluded that substantial evidence clearly
supported the Secretary's refusal to accept Martin's allegations of significantly
decreased work activity and assumption of increased duties by his wife. The
court noted that, in essence, the shifting of salaries and corporate titles were
changes of form rather than substance.79 The court went on to assail the
scheme devised by Martin as a "blatant example" of a fictitious family salary
arrangement not at all in keeping with the realities of the business.8"
After analyzing the jurisprudence dealing with questionable retirement issues,
the court endorsed the three-factor analysis discussed in Heer.8 , However,
while Heer simply held that among "several" factors to consider in assessing
benefit entitlement were continued performance of "substantial and valuable
services" by the benefit applicant, receipt by a family member of unwarranted
salary increases, and use of the family member's income to support the
individual claiming benefits, 2 Martin, through its endorsement of Taubenfeld
v. Bowen,83 implicitly holds that all three of these factors must be present
before the Secretary may pierce the veil of fictitious income arrangements.
Stated another way, Martin holds that unless the evidence demonstrates the
existence of a scheme of shifting wages to another individual through which the
74. 894 F.2d at 1532.
75. 894 F.2d at 1530.
76. 894 F.2d at 1533.
77. Id.
78. 894 F.2d at 1530.
79. Id.
80. 894 F.2d at 1533.
81. 894 F.2d at 1532. See supra text accompanying note 49.
82. See supra text accompanying note 49.
83. 685 F. Supp. 237 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
84. 894 F.2d at 1533.
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benefit applicant derives support, the Secretary has no authority to vitiate a
fictitious income arrangement. Entitlement to benefits must, therefore, be judged
on the basis of the earned income claimed by the individual seeking benefits.
Having concluded that substantial evidence supported the Secretary's determina-
tions with respect to each of the three factors discussed in Heer, the Eleventh
Circuit affined the Secretary's denial of Martin's application for retirement
insurance benefits."5
In Rand v. Sullivan," Rand and his wife were the sole shareholders in
International Foods of America, a food brokerage business operated out of their
home." While both parties worked in the business, prior to 1979, Rand
devoted more time to the business than his wife. In July of 1979, Rand, having
reached age sixty-five and being in ill health, applied for and subsequently began
receiving monthly retirement benefits. The record reflects that Rand continued
to work in the business subsequent to his alleged retirement at a reduced salary
of $400 per month. His wife's salary, on the other hand, grew considerably,
increasing from $22,900 in 1979 to $49,000 by 1983. In 1984, having reached
the age of sixty-five, Rand's wife applied for retirement benefits. By this time,
Rand had reached age seventy and therefore, was not subject to any reduction in
retirement benefits based on earned income.88 In her application for benefits,
Rand's wife claimed to have turned over control of the business to her husband
whose health had since improved.
The Secretary, suspecting the Rands had engaged in a scheme of wage
shifting in order to recover benefits, opened an investigation and determined
Rand in fact had never retired within the meaning of the Act and regulations and
had, therefore, been overpaid benefits from 1979 to 1984. The Secretary's initial
determination of overpayment was affirmed on reconsideration and thereafter by
the administrative law judge' On review, the Appeals Council found the
services performed by the Rands from 1979 to 1984 were of equal value and
allocated one-half of the total wages received by the parties during the years in
question to Rand. Since the value of Rand's services and resultant wage
allocation exceeded the maximum allowed by law, the Appeals Council upheld
the previous determination that Rand had erroneously been paid retirement
benefits during the years in question.
In affirming, the Ninth Circuit initially pointed out that, contrary to the
assertions made by Rand, the Secretary did not question the time he devoted to
the business or the nature of the services performed.90 The court observed the
Secretary based her decision on her determination that the nominal salary
85. Id.
86. 924 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1990).
87. 924 F.2d at 160.
88. See supra note 10.
89. 924 F.2d at 161.
90. 924 F.2d at 161. See infra note 93.
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received by Rand was not representative of the services he performed.9' The
court then concluded the Secretary's allocation of earnings and determination of
overpayment were supported by substantial evidence.92  In affirming the
determination of overpayment, the Ninth Circuit relied upon the Rands'
testimony as to their respective duties, and the circumstances surrounding Rand's
retirement for medical reasons and Rand's subsequent recovery, and statements
from four of Rand's customers, all of whom maintained they were unaware of
any change in the management of the business during the years 1979-1984.93
Roper v. Secretary of Health and Human Services94 and Taubenfeld v.
Bowen95 are two district court decisions worthy of discussion. In Roper, the
Secretary determined the claimant, Roper, was obligated to repay retirement
benefits received during the years 1983-1985, totalling $13,739 based on her
determination that during this period Roper's allocated earnings exceeded the
maximum allowed by law.
Roper applied for retirement benefits in August of 1983 and was awarded
benefits effective December of 1983. The record reflects that during the period
in question Roper's wife and son were the owners of 100% of the outstanding
stock in an incorporated business known as S. Roper Co. while Roper was the
sole shareholder of Real Care, Inc., a Subchapter S corporation organized to
provide administrative services to S. Roper Co. Although Roper conceded he
spent an average of seven to seven and one-half hours per day on the premises
of either business, he maintained he was not always engaged in company
business. Roper claimed no earned income in 1983. In 1984, he claimed wages
from Real Care, Inc. of $5,000, and in 1985, he claimed wages from Real Care,
Inc. of $4,000. Roper, therefore, drew no salary from S. Roper Co. He
contended he did not draw a larger salary from Real Care, Inc. because the
corporation was financially unable to pay him any more money during this
period.
In deciding against Roper, the administrative law judge noted Roper's salary
was not representative of the value of services performed, pointing out that
Roper provided much of the managerial expertise and made most of the major
business decisions for both corporations." The administrative law judge
reasoned it was most unlikely that someone with Roper's experience and
background would perform services for such nominal wages had he and his
family not owned the corporations involved. The administrative law judge
further observed that S. Roper Co. and Real Care, Inc. profited from Roper's
91. 924 F.2d at 161.
92. Id.
93. Id. Interestingly, the court went to great lengths to point out that Rand's assertions as to
the type and amount of work performed were not being questioned, even though the evidence relied
upon by the Ninth Circuit did, in some respects, contradict Rand's testimony on such issues.
94. 769 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
95. 685 F. Supp. 237 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
96. 769 F. Supp. at 246.
1059
0LOUISIANA LAWREVIEW
willingness to accept below-standard compensation in an amount equal to the
difference between the value of services rendered and the amount of compensa-
tion paid. Furthermore, because Roper owned all of the stock in Real Care, Inc.
and his wife and son owned all of the stock in S. Roper Co., Roper derived a
benefit identical to that received by such corporations. Thus, the administrative
law judge concluded the value of services rendered, rather than earned income
reportedly received, was the determining factor in assessing benefit entitlement.
Finding such value to be in excess of the maximum allowed by law during the
years in question, the administrative law judge concluded Roper was not entitled
to benefits during such period and was, therefore, overpaid a total of $13,739.
Citing Section 403(f)(4)(A) and (B) as its authority in reviewing the
Secretary's findings, the district court noted that the wages of individuals
claiming benefits are presumed by law to be in excess of the applicable exempt
amount.97 Turning its attention to the facts, the court agreed with the magi-
strate's determination that Real Care, Inc. and S. Roper Co. were separate,
distinct, legitimate, and active business concerns.9" Additionally, the court
noted that absent a specific finding that Roper had received some form of
"hidden income," the Secretary was without the authority to allocate additional
income to him for purposes of determining benefit entitlement." Finding the
earned income received by Roper during the years in question to be below the
applicable exempt amounts and finding "no evidence of any irregularities in the
structuring of the corporations or of Roper converting, diverting, or shielding
income,"' ' the court reversed the Secretary's determination that Roper had
been overpaid retirement benefits during the years in question.' 0'
In Taubenfeld v. Bowen, °2 Taubenfeld filed an application for retirement
benefits in August of 1984, alleging retirement as of April of 1984 from Kontrol
Menswear Corporation, Inc., a small family-operated business. At such time, he
resigned as president, relinquished control of daily business operations, and
reduced his involvement from two hundred to seventy-two hours per month.
Taubenfeld asserted in his application for benefits that his wife and two sons had
assumed the majority of his prior duties and in consideration thereof had received
substantial wage increases. Taubenfeld's annual salary, on the other hand,
97. The court clearly misplaced its reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 403(f)(4)(A)-(B) (1988). These
provisions only apply if entitlement to a grace year is at issue. Nevertheless, as noted previously,
the individual alleging entitlement to benefits does have the burden of proving all facts necessary to
establish entitlement. 20 C.F.R. § 404.704 (1994). See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
98. 769 F. Supp. at 248.
99. Id.
100. 769 F. Supp. at 248-49.
101. 769 F. Supp. at 249. Ironically, as the administrative law judge pointed out in his reasons
for decision, Roper did in fact receive hidden income because as the sole shareholder in Real Care,
Inc., he directly profited from his willingness to accept below-standard wages, as did his family
members who owned all of the stock in S. Roper Co.
102. 685 F. Supp. 237 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
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dropped from $32,000 to $6,960 at the time of his alleged retirement in April of
1984. He also reported wages for 1985 totalling $7,320.
Taubenfeld's application for benefits was denied through the Appeals
Council level. In affirming the administrative law judge's denial of benefits, the
Appeals Council pointed out that Taubenfeld continued to perform duties vital
to the success of the business including customer solicitation and the making of
important business decisions. The Appeals Council also noted that corporate tax
returns for 1983 and 1984 revealed that Kontrol Menswear Corporation, Inc.
maintained substantial undistributed corporate earnings which Taubenfeld had the
ability to pay to himself at anytime. These earnings, the Appeals Council
concluded, could be constructively allocated to Taubenfeld to reflect the
reasonable value of his services, it being the opinion of the Appeals Council that
Taubenfeld's declared salary for 1984 and 1985 did not reflect his worth to the
business. The Appeals Council then concluded, for purposes of determining
entitlement to benefits, that Taubenfeld's earned income consisted of his stated
salary together with retained earnings of an amount equal to his ownership
interest in the business, twenty-four and one-half percent of outstanding stock in
1984 and twenty-seven percent of outstanding stock in 1985. The combination
of these figures, the Appeals Council reasoned, represented the reasonable worth
of services performed by Taubenfeld during the years in question. In that
Taubenfeld's actual and "imputed wages" exceeded the maximum allowed by
law, his claim for benefits was, in the opinion of the Appeals Council, properly
denied.
In reversing the Secretary's determination, the district court acknowledged
Taubenfeld had clearly rearranged his business affairs in order to qualify for
retirement benefits, correctly pointing out that he was free to do so as long as he
was "legitimately retired and the arrangement was bona fide."' °3 Citing the
three-point analysis discussed in Heer as the applicable standard, the court went
on to conclude that unless all three factors are shown to exist, the Secretary
cannot treat the salary arrangement of a business as a "sham" or "scheme of
shifting wages."" 4 Applying the Heer criteria to the facts of the case, the
court had little difficulty in concluding that Taubenfeld "continued to contribute
substantial services despite the reduced work hours."' 5  With regard to the
second point of the analysis, the court found no evidence that the duties
performed by Taubenfeld's wife and two sons were not commensurate with their
increased salaries."° Finally, without articulating any supporting rationale, the
103. 685 F. Supp. at 239.
104. 685 F. Supp. at 240 n.4. The court cited Bryan v. Mathews, 427 F. Supp. 1263 (D.D.C.
1977) as its authority for this position. Under this approach, even if the evidence demonstrates that
Taubenfeld's salary was not indicative of his worth to the business, this would not, standing alone,
preclude receipt of benefits, notwithstanding the fact that the value of services performed exceeds the
maximum allowed by law.
105. 685 F. Supp. at 240.
106. Id.
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court found no evidence to suggest Taubenfeld was being supported by a family
member's income."° Thus, finding only one of the three factors discussed in
Heer to be present, the court concluded the Secretary was without the authority
to vitiate the corporation's salary arrangements and to reallocate compensation
between Taubenfeld and his family members."0 8 In so holding, the court
pointed out that even where reallocation of income is warranted under the above
standard, it is the sham wage payment to a family member that is constructively
reallocated,"° noting that under no circumstances does the Secretary have the
authority to reclassify undistributed corporate profits as earnings." 0
The Taubenfeld court, therefore, holds the performance of services, the value
of which exceeds the maximum allowed by law, does not ipso facto preclude
entitlement to retirement benefits. The Taubenfeld court, like the Martin court,
further holds the Secretary may only vitiate the salary arrangements of a business
when the evidence establishes the existence of a scheme of shifting wages
through which the benefit applicant derives support.
Finally, Toner v. Schweiker," like Gardner, employs a two-factor analysis
in determining the circumstances under which the superficialities of fictitious
income arrangements may be penetrated. The court described this two-factor test
as follows:
Nevertheless, it is equally clear that, where an applicant for retirement
insurance benefits continues to render substantial services for his
corporate employer even after the time of his alleged retirement and the
corporation pays wages to a member of the applicant's family which do
not reflect the reasonable value of services provided to the corporation
by the family member, the Secretary may treat the salary arrangement
as a "sham" or "scheme of shifting wages." In such circumstances, the
Secretary may determine that the salary arrangement is fictitious and
may allocate income earned by the applicant's family member to the
applicant in order to determine the latter's entitlement to retirement
insurance benefits.12
The facts revealed Toner reduced his salary from $15,600 to $3,600 in the year
of his alleged retirement. At the same time, his wife, previously an unsalaried
employee, began receiving an annual salary of $16,000. "' The record also
107. Id. That Taubenfeld's wife, with whom he lived, was the recipient of a substantial salary
during the period in question makes this finding a curious one. Combined with evidence that
Taubenfeld's salary was arguably not enough to provide for his subsistence, this finding would
certainly suggest that he was supported by his wife's income.
108. 685 F. Supp. at 241.
109. 685 F. Supp. at 240.
110. Id. (quoting Notini v. Heckler, 624 F. Supp. 552, 554 (D. Mass. 1986).
111. 537 F. Supp. 846 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
112. 537 F. Supp. at 854 (citations omitted).
113. 537 F. Supp. at 850.
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established that'subsequent to his alleged retirement, Toner continued to be the
controlling force in the business" 4 while his wife's duties, consisting mainly
of auxiliary functions such as maintaining the corporate office, fixing meals for
employees, answering the phone, and filling in for absent employees, remained
unchanged. Given these facts, the district court agreed with the Secretary's
determination that Toner had improperly shifted wages to his spouse."' The
court also found substantial evidence that supported the Secretary's allocation of
three-quarters of the wife's salary to Toner, and the court agreed such allocation
extinguished benefit entitlement." 6 Toner, therefore, is yet another example
of the Secretary's policy of closely examining any shifting of income between
family members at or near the time the application for benefits is filed. In many
instances, this factor, standing alone, is the "red flag" that triggers a more careful
review of the merits of the claim by the adjudicative component.
As the above discussion demonstrates, the courts have consistently
recognized the right of the Secretary to vitiate fictitious income arrangements,
albeit under limited circumstances. The courts unanimously agree that in order
to vitiate a fictitious income arrangement, the existence of "allocable income"
must be established. "Allocable income," the jurisprudence indicates, includes
wages shifted to a family member or other individual," 7 as well as earnings
disguised as dividend income"8 or other unearned income." 9  To date, no
district or appellate court decisions have found undistributed corporate earnings
to be allocable income. In fact, the Gardner, Ludeking, and Taubenfeld courts
expressly repudiated this proposition. Because the courts perceive the Secre-
tary's authority to vitiate fictitious income arrangements as a right of reallocation
of income, the Secretary may only adjust the benefit applicant's earnings to the
extent of the amount of sham wage payments made or, where applicable, the
amount of earned income disguised as dividends, rental receipts, or other
unearned income. Thus, where allocable income cannot be identified, the
Secretary simply does not have authority to vitiate fictitious income arrange-
ments.
With regard to the courts' handling of wage shifting schemes, the Gardner,
Berger, Martin, Taubenfeld, and Toner courts agree that a salary arrangement
may not be vitiated unless the evidence establishes that the earnings claimed by
the benefit applicant are not in keeping with his worth to the business, and a
family member or other individual has received an increase in salary with no
commensurate increase in duties. However, Martin and Taubenfeld stipulate that
the evidence must also demonstrate that the benefit applicant derives support
114. 537 F. Supp. at 855.
115. Id.
116. 537 F. Supp. at 855-56.
117. Gardner v. Hall, 366 F.2d 132, 135 (10th Cir. 1966).
118. Ludeking v. Finch, 421 F.2d 499, 503 (8th Cir. 1970).
119. Roper v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 769 F. Supp. 243, 248 (N.D. Ohio
1990).
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from the wage shifting scheme. Berger, Gardner, and Toner clearly do not
impose such a requirement.
The application of differing standards by the courts in determining the
circumstances under which the Secretary may vitiate unrepresentative salary
arrangements can be attributed, in large part, to the absence of any statutory or
regulatory guidance on such issue. The apparent irreconcilability of the Berger
and Martin decisions is particularly troublesome when one considers that both
decisions have been adopted as rulings by the Secretary. Thus, the Secretary is
now on record as having endorsed what appear to be conflicting positions on this
important issue. If the Secretary in fact, through the adoption of Martin as a
ruling, intended to impose a more onerous standard on the exercise of the
Secretary's authority to vitiate fictitious income arrangements, one cannot help
but wonder why S.S.R. 88-12c was not rescinded in connection with the
Secretary's adoption of the Martin decision as S.S.R. 91-1c. Could it be the
Secretary has failed to recognize the irreconcilability of these decisions? A close
review of Martin, which adopts the three-point analysis discussed by the Sixth
Circuit in Heer as the applicable standard, reveals that the court did not even
acknowledge that Berger had previously been adopted by the Secretary as a
ruling, nor did the court in Martin even so much as make reference to the Berger
decision! This, indeed, is a curious finding when one considers the fact that
Berger, not Heer, was the most recent pronouncement of the Sixth Circuit on this
issue at the time Martin was decided.
Thus, in the final analysis, the Secretary's adoption of Martin as a ruling,
while unquestionably a commendable effort to clarify his position on a difficult
issue, raises more questions than it answers. Ironically, the state of confusion
currently existing in this area of the law is not the result of the Secretary's
having adopted, through its promulgation of S.S.R. 91-1c, a position no longer
the law of the Sixth Circuit. In fact, by adopting the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in Martin as a ruling, the Secretary has endorsed a position that was never the
law of the Sixth Circuit because, contrary to the court's finding in Martin, Heer
clearly does not hold that all three factors discussed therein must be present in
order for the Secretary to have the authority to vitiate wage shifting schemes. 20
To further confuse matters, the Secretary failed to rescind S.S.R. 88-12c
contemporaneously with the adoption of S.S.R. 91-1c, thus leaving everyone
wondering what the Secretary's current position is with regard to this crucial
issue.
The Secretary must now act to clear up the confusion resulting from the
adoption of differing standards as to the circumstances under which unrepresent-
ed salary arrangements may be vitiated. The Secretary can best end the
confusion by filling the void currently existing in the present regulatory scheme
through the adoption of new regulatory provisions delineating the circumstances
under which such income-shifting arrangements may be vitiated by the Secretary.
120. See supra text accompanying note 49.
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Nothing short of regulatory action will suffice considering the divergence of
present opinion largely attributable to the fact that the only guidance offered by
the Secretary up to this point has come through the issuance of rulings not
binding upon the courts' and seldom recognized as persuasive authority by.
the jurisprudence. Furthermore, in addition to regulating the circumstances under
which wage shifting schemes may be vitiated, the Secretary should also define
by regulation the circumstances under which other fictitious income arrangements
may be vitiated, including those arrangements through which the benefit
applicant converts or reclassifies earnings as dividends or other unearned income.
D. What Should the Correct Standard Be?
In an effort to ascertain the legally correct standard for determining the
circumstances under which the Secretary may vitiate fictitious income arrange-
ments, examination of the Act, regulations, and legislative history is now
appropriate. As noted previously, the courts have consistently conditioned the
exercise of the Secretary's authority to vitiate income arrangements on the
existence of allocable income arising out of a wage shifting scheme or out of
another arrangement through which income has been diverted, converted, or
reclassified. While the courts do not agree on the precise standard to be applied
when dealing with wage shifting schemes, the cases have consistently held
allocable or shifted wages must always exist before the salary arrangements of
a business may be vitiated.'2 In cases involving efforts to convert or reclassi-
fy earnings as unearned income are concerned, the courts have applied a uniform
standard. Disguised earnings may not be reallocated to the benefit applicant for
purposes of determining entitlement unless the evidence establishes the converted
or reclassified earnings were actually received by the individual claiming benefits
as dividend income, rental receipts, or some other form of unearned income. 3
An alternative approach would allow the Secretary to vitiate any unrepresent-
ed income arrangement. Under this approach, in any case in which the earned
income claimed by the benefit applicant is not representative of his worth to the
business, the Secretary would have the right to pierce the superficialities of the
arrangement and to assess benefit entitlement on the basis of the reasonable value
of services performed. Here, the Secretary's authority to adjust the benefit
applicant's earnings is not tied in any way to the existence or amount of
allocable income, and benefit entitlement is accordingly judged on the basis of
the reasonable value of services performed in any case in which an unrepre-
sentative income arrangement is shown to exist. In spite of the lack of
jurisprudential support for such a standard, the Secretary should adopt by
121. See supra note 4.
122. See infra pp. 1066-67.
123. Gardner v. Hall, 366 F.2d 132 (10th Cir. 1966); Ludeking v. Finch, 421 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.
1970); Taubenfeld v. Bowen, 685 F. Supp. 237 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
1065
6LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
regulation this value-oriented approach to resolving questionable retirement
issues, thus repudiating the allocable income standards advanced by the courts.
Two persuasive arguments are submitted in support of this position.
First, the basic purpose of both the retirement and disability insurance
programs established by Congress is to replace earnings lost as a result of the
worker's leaving the labor market because of old age or disability. 24 Without
question, the court-adopted standards for vitiating income arrangements
undermine, rather than further, this fundamental purpose. Consider the following
scenarios. Martin and Taubenfeld, as discussed, hold the salary arrangements of
a business cannot be vitiated unless the evidence demonstrates that the benefit
applicant derives support from a family member to whom he has improperly
shifted or diverted wages. Under this standard, the owner of a closely held
corporation with earnings in excess of the maximum allowed by law may, upon
reaching early retirement or retirement age, arbitrarily reduce his earnings below
the applicable exempt amount, channel the difference to a son, daughter, or other
individual, and draw full retirement benefits as long as he does not derive
support through such arrangement. In fact, Martin sanctions full benefit recovery
under such scenario even where the benefit applicant continues to work on a full
time basis. But, can it reasonably be argued that the fundamental purpose of the
retirement insurance program is furthered by awarding benefits under these
circumstances? Have earnings been "lost" because of "old age" or "retirement"?
I submit not.
Second, the slightly less onerous standard imposed in Gardner, Berger, and
Toner would indeed allow the Secretary to vitiate the above fictitious salary
arrangement and constructively reallocate the shifted or diverted wages to the
wage earner for purposes of determining entitlement to benefits. Under an
equally disturbing scenario, however, recovery of benefits can be had under this
standard as well as under the court-adopted standard for vitiating arrangements
through which earnings are converted or reclassified as unearned income.
Assume the same factors noted above except here the business owner elects to
funnel the savings derived from his self-imposed reduction in salary back into
the corporation. Without question, the net worth of the business will be
increased proportionate to any reduction in salary, and this, of course, inures to
the benefit of the business owner. The business owner then is no less rewarded
for his labor under these facts than if he had continued to accept full compensa-
tion for services rendered. Considering this result, is the business owner under
these facts any more "retired" than in the first example? More to the point,
should an individual be afforded the basic protection of the retirement insurance
program when, in substance, he has simply funneled income back into his
124. S. Rep. No. 1669, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). See also Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S.
.181, 185-86, 97 S. Ct. 431, 434 (1976) (The primary objective of the Old Age Insurance Program
established under Title II "was to provide workers and their families with basic protection against
hardships created by lost earnings due to... old age,").
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business while continuing to work on a full-time basis? That the wages are
shifted or diverted back to the business and not to another individual should be
of no moment. Yet, interestingly, under the court-adopted standards noted above,
recovery of full benefits is allowed under these facts but denied under the first
scenario. In each instance, income has only been diverted or shifted, not "lost"
through "retirement." For this reason, recovery of benefits in either case
undermines the beneficent purposes for which the retirement insurance program
was established.
In summary, the above examples succinctly point out that the court-adopted
standards for vitiating income arrangements are amenable to efforts to recover
benefits through contrived or unrepresentative arrangements. This result can be
attributed to court-adopted standards that place excessive and legally insupport-
able constraints on the Secretary's vitiating powers, thus precluding the exposure
of many of the corporate shell games devised by overzealous benefit applicants.
In practical effect, the court-adopted standards have unwittingly established
gaping "loopholes" in the retirement insurance program and have therefore
unquestionably undermined its basic purpose.
III. THE VALUE-ORIENTED STANDARD
A closer look at the value-oriented standard endorsed by this article and the
extent to which this approach furthers the fundamental purpose for which the
retirement insurance program was established is appropriate. As noted
previously, under this standard, the Secretary is vested with the authority to
vitiate any income arrangement which is fictitious-any income arrangement in
which the earned income claimed is not indicative of the value of services
rendered by the benefit applicant. Once the income arrangement of the business
is vitiated, benefit entitlement then turns on the value of services rendered by the
benefit applicant, irrespective of the existence or amount of allocable income.
This approach to resolving questionable retirement issues assuredly furthers the
overriding purpose of the retirement insurance program because under a proper
application of this standard, any and all arrangements whereby income may be
shifted, diverted, converted, or reclassified are subject to the vitiating powers of
the Secretary. Under this approach, benefits are only paid to those individuals
whose earnings are reduced as a result of a cessation or reduction in work
activity rather than as a result of a rechannelization or reclassification of
earnings. Hence, this value-oriented approach to resolving questionable
retirement issues would call for a denial of benefits in each of the factual
scenarios discussed above. With regard to the first scenario, wherein the benefit
applicant diverts a portion of his earnings to a family member or other individual
in order to qualify for benefits, the Secretary would be free to vitiate the salary
arrangement as the earned income claimed by the wage earner is clearly
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unrepresentative of the value of services rendered.'25 Entitlement to benefits
would therefore be judged on the basis of the reasonable value of services
rendered which, in this case, exceeds the maximum allowed by law as evidenced
by the benefit applicant's earnings being in excess of such amount prior to the
implementation of this fictitious salary arrangement. Thus, recovery of benefits
is denied as the fictitious salary arrangement contrived by the benefit applicant
has been exposed and properly vitiated.
Recovery of benefits is likewise denied under the second factual scenario
discussed above. In this scenario, the owner of a closely held corporation
arbitrarily reduces his earnings below the applicable exempt amount, funnels the
wage savings back into the business, and continues to work on a full time basis.
Because the benefit applicant has not reduced his work activity, the value of the
services he renders to the business continues to be in excess of the maximum
allowed by law. Under the value-oriented standard, however, the fictitious
income arrangement would be vitiated, as the claimed earnings do not reflect the
individual's worth to the business. The Secretary would judge entitlement to
benefits based on the reasonable value of services performed and would deny the
application for benefits. In summary, the above observations and discussion
make clear that the value-oriented approach to resolving questionable retirement
issues furthers the beneficent purposes for which the retirement insurance
program was established. Benefits are not awarded unless earnings are lost
because of the cessation or substantial reduction of work activity otherwise
known as "retirement." This standard, therefore, should be adopted in regulatory
form by the Secretary.
A second, albeit less compelling reason for the establishment of the
retirement insurance program, is to encourage retirement at age sixty-two or
beyond to create job opportunities for younger workers.' 26 The court-adopted
standards for vitiating income arrangements do not undermine this purpose by
discouraging, rather than encouraging, retirement by endorsing receipt of full
benefits by individuals who continue to work on a full or near a full time basis
provided the benefit applicant is astute enough to avoid those fictitious income
arrangements proscribed by the jurisprudence. Conversely, the value-oriented
standard promotes retirement at age sixty-two or beyond by reducing or
eliminating the benefits of any individual who elects to continue working in any
case in which the level of work activity, as revealed by the value assigned to the
work activity, exceeds regulatory prescribed levels.
This author, therefore, advocates that the Secretary adopt by regulation the
value-oriented standard. The ratification of this standard by regulation will
achieve two very important ends. First, the Secretary will have finally moved
125. This result can be logically deduced from the fact that the benefit applicant was paid
significantly higher wages for the performance of the same services prior to his alleged "retirement."
126. H.R. Rep. No. 702, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 49 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4155, 4206.
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to fill a significant void in the current regulatory scheme as presently no
regulations defining the circumstances under which the Secretary may vitiate
income arrangements exist. Second, the Secretary will have substantially reduced
the likelihood of benefits being obtained through contrived or fictitious income
arrangements. Further, contemporaneous with the adoption of the value-oriented
standard by regulation, the Secretary should rescind both S.S.R. 91-1c and S.S.R.
88-12c. These rulings endorse irreconcilable court-adopted standards for vitiating
fictitious income arrangements, and both standards undermine the purposes for
which the retirement insurance program was established.
IV. ADJUSTMENT OR RECOVERY OF OVERPAID BENEFITS
Section 404(a)(1) provides that where the Secretary "finds that more or less
than the correct amount of payment has been made to any person under this
subchapter, proper adjustment or recovery shall be made, under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary.""' Section 404(b) stipulates that no adjustment
or recovery will be allowed to any person who is without fault if adjustment or
recovery "would defeat the purposes of this subchapter or would be against
equity and good consequence." ' The Secretary's implementing regulations
are contained at Subpart F of Part 404 of the Code of Federal Regulations.'29
A brief review of these regulations follows.
The regulations provide that the term "overpayment' "includes a payment
in excess of the amount due under Title II of the Act, a failure to impose
deductions or to suspend or reduce benefits[,] . .. and a payment where no
amount is payable under Title II of the Act.""'3  The regulations divide
overpayments into two broad categories--deduction overpayments and
entitlement overpayments. While no definition is provided by regulation, a
review of the types of deduction overpayments enumerated under Section
404.510 reveals that the term refers to overpayments resulting from the failure
of the Secretary to implement deductions or offsets provided for in the Act or
regulations. 3 ' For example, an overpayment resulting from the receipt of
excess earnings by a recipient of retirement insurance benefits is considered a
"deduction overpayment." The regulations define an "entitlement overpayment"
as a benefit payment to an individual who does not satisfy the elements of
entitlement provided by the Act or regulation or a benefit payment in excess of
the amount to which such person is entitled."' The erroneous payment of
retirement benefits to an individual who is under the age of sixty-two would be
127. 42 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1) (1988).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1988).
129. 20 C.F.R. § 404 (1988) [hereinafter referred to by section number].
130. 20 C.F.R. § 404.501(a) (1994).
131. 20 C.F.R. § 404.510 (1994).
132. 20 C.F.R. § 404.510a (1994).
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in the nature of an entitlement overpayment, as would an overpayment resulting
from the erroneous calculation of the monthly benefit amount.
Section 404.506 reaffirms the benefit recipient's entitlement to waiver of
adjustment or recovery of the overpayment where such person is: (1) without
fault, and (2) adjustment or recovery would either defeat the purposes of the Act
or be against equity and good conscience. 3 Section 404.507 provides that the
following acts or omissions are deemed to constitute fault under the regulations:
(a) a statement made by an individual who knew or should have known
such statement was false or inaccurate;
(b) failure to furnish information when the individual knew or should
have known that such information was material to the claim;
(c) acceptance of benefits the individual knew or should have known
were not owed.'
34
Section 404.507 further provides that in determining whether or not the benefit
applicant is at fault, all pertinent circumstances, including age, education, mental
and physical capacity, are to be taken into consideration.'35 The recipients of
deduction overpayments are, however, held to a higher standard of care under the
regulations. Specifically, Section 404.511(a) states that in the case of a
deduction overpayment, fault is established if the individual either lacks "good
faith" or fails to exercise a high degree of care "in determining whether
circumstances which may cause deductions from his benefits should be brought
to the attention of the Administration."' 36
Section 404.508(a) provides that adjustment or recovery is deemed to defeat
the purposes of the Act when it operates to deprive .the individual of income
required for ordinary and necessary living expenses.' Section 404.509 states
that adjustment or recovery of an overpayment is deemed against equity and
good conscience in either of the following situations:
(a) the individual from whom adjustment or recovery is sought has
changed his position for the worse or relinquished a valuable right in
reliance upon funds received or in reliance upon a notice of forthcoming
payments;
133. 20 C.F.R. § 404.506 (1994). In keeping with longstanding policy, S.S.R. 94-4p (Cum. Ed.
1990-91) recognizes the benefit recipient's right to a pre-recoupment hearing before a request for
waiver can be denied. S.S.R. 94-4p further provides that at the pre-recoupment hearing, the benefit
recipient has the right to testify, cross examine witnesses, offer documents into evidence, and make
arguments-with or without the assistance of a legal representative. The ruling clearly provides,
however, that if the individual from whom the adjustment or recovery is sought contests the
correctness of the overpayment but does not claim entitlement to a waiver, the individual has no right
to a pre-recoupment hearing.
134. 20 C.F.R. § 404.507 (1994).
135. 20 C.F.R. § 404.507 (1994).
136. 20 C.F.RL § 404.511(a) (1994).
137. 20 C.F.R. § 404.508(a) (1994).
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(b) the individual from whom adjustment or recovery is sought was
living in a separate household from the overpaid individual at the time
such payment was made and did not receive any portion thereof.'
Section 507 provides that the fault of the Secretary in causing the overpay-
ment does not bar adjustment or recovery thereof.139 However, one exception
to this rule exists. Section 404.510 states that as to the types of deduction
overpayments enumerated therein,"4 the benefit recipient shall be deemed
without fault if any of the circumstances described in the succeeding subsections
of the regulation are shown to exist.' 4' One such circumstance, described
under subsection (b), is an overpayment resulting from the individual's reliance
upon an erroneous interpretation of the Act or regulations by a source within the
Social Security Administration or other governmental agency that the benefit
recipient reasonably believed was connected with the administration of benefits.
Hence, if a recipient of retirement insurance benefits, relying upon an erroneous
interpretation of a statutory or regulatory provision by a claims representative
employed by the Social Security Administration, fails to report excess earnings,
the recipient is deemed without fault in causing the overpayment. Additionally,
Section 405.510(a) provides that, as to any entitlement overpayment, the benefit
recipient is deemed without fault in any case in which the circumstances
described at Section 404.510(b) are shown to exist. 42 Furthermore, Section
404.512 states that "in the situations described in §§ 404.510(b) ... and
404.510(a), adjustment or recovery will be waived since it will be deemed such
adjustment or recovery is against equity and good conscience." 4  Thus, if a
deduction overpayment arises from excess earnings received by a recipient of
138. 20 C.F.R. § 404.509 (1994). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.330-349 (1994) allow the spouse of an
insured individual entitled to retirement or disability benefits to draw spousal benefits under limited
circumstances. The circumstances described above could therefore arise, for example, if either the
insured individual or his/her spouse is overpaid benefits while such parties are living separate and
apart from each other.
139. 20 C.F.R. § 404.507 (1994).
140. One of the overpayments listed under 20 C.F.R. § 404.510 (1994) is an overpayment
resulting from the failure to report an event described under 42 U.S.C. § 403(b) (1988 & Supp. V
1993) dealing in part with deductions from retirement benefits based on work activity. The
remaining deduction overpayments described at 20 C.F.R. § 404.510 (1994) have somewhat limited
application. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1988) (deductions from old age and survivor's benefits
because of non-covered work outside the United States or because of failure to have child in one's
care); 42 U.S.C. § 403(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (deductions from dependents' benefits on account
of non-covered work outside the United States by old age insurance beneficiary); 42 U.S.C. § 422(b)
(1988) (deductions from disability insurance benefits because of refusal to accept rehabilitation
services); 42 U.S.C. § 402(t) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (suspension of old age and survivor's insurance
benefits of aliens living outside the United States; residency requirements for. dependents and
survivors); 42 U.S.C. § 428 (1988) (benefits at age seventy-two for certain uninsured individuals).
141. 20 C.F.R. § 404.510 (1994).
142. 20 C.F.R. § 404.510(a) (1994).
143. 20 C.F.R. § 404.512 (1994).
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retirement benefits or if any entitlement overpayment is involved, the benefit
recipient is entitled to waiver in any case in which the evidence establishes that
the overpaid benefits were received in reliance upon an erroneous interpretation
of the Act or regulations by any of the parties described above.
Once the liability of the overpaid individual is fixed, the Secretary may
enforce collection through a variety of methods. Section 404.502(a) provides
that if the overpaid individual is alive and receiving disability, retirement, or
other benefits provided under Title II of the Act, the Secretary is authorized to
withhold the full amount of Title II benefits payable to such person until a sum
equal to the amount of the overpayment has been recovered.'" Section
404.502(b) provides that if the overpaid individual is deceased, the Secretary may
seek recovery directly from the estate of the overpaid individual or withhold any
Title II benefits payable to such estate.' S.S.R. 87-8'46 provides that the
heir of an overpaid individual is liable for the overpayment to the extent of the
value of such individual's inheritance. This ruling further provides that where
the heir has taken possession of his share of the estate, the liability of such
person is limited to the amount of "estate assets in his possession at the time of
receipt of the overpaid notice."' 47 Finally, if the overpaid individual is not
currently receiving Title II benefits, Section 404.515 authorizes the Secretary to
refer the claim to the Internal Revenue Service for offset against any tax refunds
payable to such person.'4
The jurisprudence has played an active role in recent years both in
establishing and interpreting overpayment law. Curiously, the Act and
regulations do not assign the burden of proof where adjustment (offsetting) or
recovery of overpaid benefits or entitlement to waiver is at issue. 4 9 Hence,
the jurisprudence must answer these important questions. Cannuni on Behalf of
Cannuni v. Schweiker 50 holds that in overpayment proceedings, the Secretary
must establish the fact of the overpayment. Conversely, Valente v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services'' holds that the benefit recipient has the burden
of proving entitlement to a waiver of adjustment or recovery. Cannuni and
Valente would seem to be consistent with fundamental common-law precepts as
144. 20 C.F.R. 404.502(a) (1994).
145. 20 C.F.R. § 404.502(b) (1994).
146. S.S.R. 87-8 (Cure. Ed. 1987).
147. while the Secretary has not spoken to this issue, one can reasonably assume that the heir's
liability would not be so limited if the evidence establishes that the heir disposed of estate property
with knowledge of the existence of the overpayment.
148. 20 C.F.R. § 404.515 (1994).
149. 20 C.F.R. § 404.704 (1994) assigns the burden of proof in cases in which entitlement or
continued entitlement to benefits is at issue. This regulation therefore does not apply to cases in
which the Secretary seeks adjustment or recovery of overpaid benefits or in which entitlement to
waiver is claimed by the benefit recipient.
150. 740 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1984). See also United States v. Smith, 482 F.2d 1120 (8th Cir.
1973).
151. 733 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1984).
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in each case the burden of proof is placed on the party seeking relief, be it the
Secretary or the benefit recipient.
Two rather interesting cases dealing with the fault issue are worthy of
discussion herein. In Austin v. Shalala,"' Austin's husband died in 1968, and
she was awarded widow's insurance benefits based on his earnings record
pursuant to an application filed in September of 1980.2 She thereafter filed
a claim for retirement insurance benefits based on her own earnings record in
June of 1987. In processing the latter application, it was discovered that Austin
had married again in 1977 which ipso facto disqualified her from receiving
widow's benefits." 4 Accordingly, the Secretary assessed an overpayment of
$24,705. Austin requested waiver of the overpayment, claiming that at the time
the application for widow's benefits was filed, she advised the claims officer she
was in the process of obtaining a divorce but had not yet instituted legal
proceedings. Austin further stated that at no time did the claims officer advise
her that the existing marriage disqualified her from receiving widow's bene-
fits.'55 The application for widow's benefits, completed by the claims officer
based on information supplied by Austin, did not contain any information
regarding Austin's existing marriage. The evidence further revealed that Austin
in fact never did file for divorce as she reconciled with her husband five months
after filing the application for widow's benefits.
The Fifth Circuit concluded substantial evidence supported the administrative
law judge's determination that Austin was negligent in signing the application
form without reviewing and verifying its contents. S6 As to whether or not
Austin's negligence constituted "fault" under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.506 and 404.507,
the court answered this question in the affirmative, noting that "when a claimant
fails to read a benefit form and verify that the information therein is correct, the
claimant who signs the form may be held to be 'at fault' if the information turns
out to be incorrect."'' This being the case, the court held that the administra-
tive law judge properly denied Austin's request for waiver, notwithstanding the
fact that the claims officer may have erred in failing to report information which
would have disqualified Austin from receiving benefits.'
Perhaps the claimant's request for waiver should have been granted under
Section 404.512(a) of the regulations. The overpayment in question was clearly
an entitlement overpayment as it arose because the benefit applicant failed to
152. 994 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1993).
153. See supra note 138.
154. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.336(e) (1994), which provides that, subject to the three exceptions
enumerated therein, remarriage extinguishes entitlement to widow's benefits.
155. Austin's testimony in this regard is taken from the district court's opinion affirming the
Secretary's denial of Austin's waiver request. Austin v. Sullivan, 830 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
156. 994 F.2d at 1174.
157. Id.
158. Id. Recall that 20 C.F.R. § 404.507 (1994) provides that the fault of the Secretary will
generally not bar adjustment or recovery of overpaid benefits.
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meet one of the conditions of entitlement under Section 404.335, i.e., that she be
unmarried. Assuming the testimony to be accurate, one could argue that by
failing to advise Austin that her undissolved marriage precluded receipt of
benefits, the claims officer tacitly and erroneously represented that it had no
effect on benefit entitlement. If one accepts this premise, recovery of overpaid
benefits is deemed against equity and good conscience and is therefore waived
under Section 404.512(a).' 59 The judiciary will not likely ever accept such a
broad interpretation of Section 512(a), even in those circuits recognized for their
heightened sensitivity to the rights of benefit claimants. In fact, this argument
was implicitly rejected by the Fifth Circuit as the court held the claims officer
had not supplied erroneous information to Austin when she filed her application
for widow's benefits. Unfortunately, however, the Fifth Circuit did not
specifically address the tacit misrepresentation issue as Austin failed to advance
this argument on appeal.
In Lang v. Sullivan," the Secretary determined Lang had been overpaid
benefits totalling $19,685.35 in 1986 and $6,760.70 in 1987. Lang worked as
a self-employed acquisitions broker, earning fees and commissions at unpredict-
able times and in varying amounts. Lang testified that he might work two
calendar years on a project, incurring operating losses along the way, and that
he might receive payment for such work a year or two after the work was
completed. Lang maintained that he was not at fault in causing the overpay-
ments in question because he reasonably assumed that Internal Revenue Code
regulations permitting taxpayers to allocate net operating losses to subsequent
years also applied in computing earnings for purposes of determining entitlement
to retirement benefits. He contended that, having reasonably relied upon
information provided by a governmental agency, the Internal Revenue Service,
he could not be held accountable for the overpayment. Lang also asserted that
he was misled by a brochure published by the Social Security Administration
discussing "allowable" business deductions for purposes of determining
entitlement to retirement benefits. The court, however, rejected both arguments
and affirmed the Secretary's determination that Lang was at fault in causing the
overpayments. The court stated:
A review of the record indicates that plaintiff was not without fault
in his receipt of the overpayments. Giving this plaintiff the most
generous interpretation of his intentions to pursue what he believed was
a permissible deduction does not relieve him of fault in the overpay-
ment. The record's findings are self evident that there were sufficient
opportunities for the plaintiff to acquire accurate and thorough informa-
tion to guide him in his financial affairs. The court is particularly
persuaded in this regard by the plaintiff's refusal to provide timely
159. See infra p. 1076 and supra note 140.
160. 762 F. Supp. 628 (D.N.J.), affd mem., 947 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 157 (1994).
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reports of net earnings to the Social Security Administration as required
by 20 C.F.R. § 404.452. Compliance with earnings reporting require-
ments would have served to identify the potential for overpayment such
that remedial action could have been attended by both plaintiff and the
Administration.
... Plaintiff listed on his federal income tax statements for 1986
and 1987 that he was self-employed as a merger and acquisition
consultant. On his brief filed pursuant to this appeal, he indicated that
he received earnings from unexpected mergers and acquisitions. The
type of financial activity that plaintiff is successfully engaged in is
sufficiently sophisticated in regard to finance. A reasonable view, and
thus, the view of this court, is that an individual capable of professional
involvement in such transactions is expected to have sufficient, if not
advanced, understanding of his own financial matters. Plaintiff,
however pleads to this court that waiver is entitled [sic] since he relied
in part upon a handout brochure disseminated by the Administration.
The court remains unpersuaded and is of the opinion that a merger and
acquisitions broker would not rely on a descriptive brochure as a
substantive resource and authority for an acquisitions project. The
suspect brochure specifies "allowable" business deductions which the
court reads as sufficient notice to Social Security income recipients,
particularly those with experience in complex financial matters, to
exercise care in their income reporting.'
Two recent decisions have repudiated the Secretary's interpretation of the
phrase "against equity and good conscience" provided in Section 404.509.62
In Groseclose v. Bowen,163 the Secretary sought to recover child's benefits"u
erroneously paid to Groseclose's daughter through deductions from his monthly
retirement insurance benefits. Groseclose requested waiver of recovery, claiming
that it would be against equity and good conscience to compel him to make
restitution. His request was denied through the Appeals Council level, and the
Secretary's determination was thereafter affirmed by the district court. On
review, the Eighth Circuit noted that the evidence clearly established that
Groseclose was not at fault in causing the overpayment, that he had not received
any portion of the fimds involved, and that he was not aware that his daughter,
who was not living with him at the time, had received benefits during the period
in question.'65 In reviewing the applicable law, the court noted that while
Section 404(b) was silent as to the meaning of the phrase "against equity and
161. 762 F. Supp. at 631-32.
162. 20 C.F.R. § 404.509 (1994).
163. 809 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1987).
164. 20 C.F.R. § 404.350-69 (1994) enumerate the circumstances under which entitlement to
child's benefits is established.
165. 809 F.2d at 504-05.
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good conscience," the Secretary had declared by regulation that adjustment or
recovery of overpaid benefits shall not be deemed against equity and good
conscience unless the benefit recipient had relinquished a valuable right or
changed his position for the worse in reliance upon the overpaid benefits or in
reliance upon a notice of payment of benefits." The Eighth Circuit agreed
with the district court that under the Secretary's narrow interpretation of this
phrase, Groseclose was clearly not entitled to waiver as the record failed to
establish the existence of either of the circumstances enumerated in Section
404.509.67 Thus, the court turned its attention to Groseclose's claim that the
Secretary's interpretation of the phrase "against equity and good conscience" was
invalid. In evaluating this argument, the court recognized that "an agency's
interpretation of the statute that it is charged with administering is entitled to
considerable deference," noting that the court may not substitute its own
construction if the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable. 6  The Eighth
Circuit pointed out, however, quoting Southeastern Community College v.
Davis,"9 that such deference is constrained by the court's obligation to adhere
to the unambiguous meaning of a statute as determined through careful
consideration of its language, purpose, and legislative history." ° Applying the
rule of statutory construction adopted by the Supreme Court in Perrin v. United
States,'7' the court noted that if, as here, the statute is silent as to the meaning
of a phrase, the words are to be interpreted according to their common, ordinary
meaning."' 7' The court then looked to a California Supreme Court decision,
Gilles v. Department of Human Resources Development,'7 for guidance in
interpreting the language of the statute. In Gilles, the court found "against equity
and good conscience" to be a phrase of uncommon generality, not at all
amenable to efforts to channel its meaning into rigid or specific rules.1
7 1
Adopting the court's interpretation in Gilles, the Eighth Circuit concluded the
adjudicator must be allowed to draw upon fundamental precepts of justice and
morality in applying the phrase "against equity and good conscience.""'
Because the Secretary's interpretation contained at Section 404.509 clearly failed
to provide such latitude, it did not reflect the common, ordinary meaning of this
166. 809 F.2d at 504. At the time this case was decided, 20 C.F.R. § 404.509 (1994) provided
that recovery of overpaid benefits would only be against equity and good conscience if the benefit
recipient has "relinquished a valuable right ... or changed his or her position for the worse" in
reliance upon the overpaid benefits or in reliance upon a notice of payment of such benefits.
167. 809 F.2d at 504 n.l.
168. 809 F.2d at 505.
169. 442 U.S. 397, 411, 99 S. Ct. 2361, 2369 (1979).
170. 809 F.2d at 505.
171. 444 U.S. 37, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979).
172. 809 F.2d at 505.
173. 521 P.2d 110 (Cal. 1974) (in bank).
174. 809 F.2d at 505.
175. Id. (quoting Giles v. Department of Human Resources Development, 521 P.2d 110 (Cal.
1974)).
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phrase. 76 Next, the court examined the legislative history of Section 404(b)
and noted that while the phrase "against equity and good conscience" was not
expressly defined therein, it did reveal an intent to apply such language in
keeping with a broad concept of fairness.'7 Considering this, the court
concluded:
[I]t cannot ' be said that the relinquishment of a valuable right and the
changing of one's position for the worse represent the only circumstanc-
es in which recoupment would be inequitable. We find it difficult to
imagine a more unfair or unjust situation than requiring a person who
is without fault to repay overpaid benefits when that person had no
knowledge of the overpayments.... Moreover, recoupment in this case
would be inconsistent witl" the policy expressed in the legislative
history-that recoupment should be equitable.'7 1
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court affirming the Secretary's denial
of Groseclose's request for a waiver was reversed, 79 and the Secretary was
directed by the court to reimburse Groseclose for any benefits withheld from his
monthly retirement checks during the pendency of this proceeding."0
The Secretary responded curiously to Groseclose. Given the Eight Circuit's
comprehensive and well reasoned analysis of the language and legislative history
of Section 404(b), one might have expected the Secretary to accede to the
holding of Groseclose by amending Section 404.509 to incorporate the broad
concept of fairness espoused by the court. Alternatively, one would expect the
Secretary to adopt the Eighth Circuit's decision via acquiescence ruling, thereby
affirming that Groseclose is the law of the Eighth Circuit. The Secretary,
however, rejected both of these approaches and opted instead to limit Groseclose
to its facts. Accordingly, Section 404.509 was simply amended to provide that,
in addition to the circumstances already specified therein, recovery of overpaid
benefits from an individual who "was living in a separate household from the
overpaid person at the time of the overpayment and did not receive the
overpayment" is also against equity and good conscience.
In Quinlivan v. Sullivan,'8 ' the benefit recipient was incarcerated from
1963 to 1985 for a felony conviction. During his imprisonment, he began
receiving Title II disability benefits as he suffered from a mental impairment
which precluded the performance of work activity. In 1980, Congress amended
the Act8 2 to prohibit incarcerated felons from receiving disability benefits.
Nevertheless, Quinlivan, who was unaware of any change in the law, continued
176. Id.
177. 809 F.2d at 505-06.
178. 809 F.2d at 506.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 916 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1990).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(1) (1988).
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to receive benefits until 1982. At that time he advised the Social Security
Administration of the overpayment after reading a booklet containing recent
changes in Social Security law. Acting on this information, the Secretary
immediately terminated benefits and forwarded to Quinlivan a notice demanding
repayment of $4,601.46 in overpaid benefits. Additionally, prior to Quinlivan's
release from prison, the Secretary instituted a continuing disability review which
resulted in a determination in 1983 that he was no longer disabled under the Act
and regulations. Consequently, upon his release from prison in 1985,
Quinlivan's disability benefits did not resume. However, pursuant to a
subsequent application for benefits filed by Quinlivan, an administrative law
judge determined in 1989 that a combination of physical and mental impairment
rendered him unable to engage in work activity, and he was therefore once again
entitled to benefits.
83
The issue before the Ninth Circuit was Quinlivan's entitlement to a waiver
of adjustment or recovery of overpaid benefits. Relying on the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Groseclose, the court held it was not bound, by the Secretary's
interpretation of the phrase "against equity and good conscience" contained in
Section 404.509(a) as the interpretation was inconsistent with the language and
history of Section 404(b).'" In so holding, the court observed that "Congress
intended a broad concept of fairness to apply to waiver requests, one that reflects
the ordinary meaning of the statutory language and takes into account the facts
and circumstances of each case."'' 5 The court thus concluded Quinlivan was
entitled to waiver as he was without fault in causing the overpayment, and
recovery of the overpayment, given the facts, "would be against equity and good
conscience as that phrase is commonly understood.""8 6  In support of its
determination with regard to the latter issue, the court stated the following:
Upon release from prison, Quinlivan had no material goods, no means
of transportation, and no income. During the three years before the
hearing on his waiver claim, he worked sporadically, holding only a few
temporary jobs. The ALJ who determined that Quinlivan was disabled
in 1989 found that his psychological impairments prevented him from
performing work during the preceding 12 months. It appears likely his
ability to work in 1985-87 was similarly affected.8 7
The irony of Quinlivan is that the court unnecessarily reached the issue of
whether it was bound by the Secretary's regulatory interpretation of the phrase
"against equity and good conscience." The court noted in its review of the facts
that Quinlivan's expenses exceeded his income which consisted of only $314 a
183. 916 F.2d at 526.
184. 916 F.2d at 526-27.
185. 916 F.2d at 527.
186. 916 F.2d at 526-27.
187. 916 F.2d at 527.
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month in state welfare benefits.' The court therefore could have easily
decided the case under Section 404.508.89 This regulation provides that
adjustment or recovery defeats the purposes of the Act when it operates "to
deprive a person of income required for ordinary and necessary living expenses."
Because Quinlivan did not have sufficient income to meet his basic living
expenses even before considering the impact of adjustment or recovery, his
circumstances clearly met the requirements of this regulation. Apparently, in its
haste to decide the case under the rationale of Groseclose, the court simply
overlooked Section 404.508.
In response to Quinlivan, the Secretary adopted ruling A.R. 92-5(9)."o
A.R. 92-5(9) sets forth the Secretary's interpretation of the Quinlivan decision
and how it will be applied in the Ninth Circuit:
In determining whether recovery of an overpayment would be "against
equity and good conscience," the adjudicator will not limit his or her
inquiry to the three specific circumstances set forth in the regulations.
The decision must take into account all of the facts and circumstances
of the case and be based on a broad concept of fairness. Factors such
as, but not limited to, the nature of the claimant's impairment, the
amount and steadiness of the claimant's income, and the claimant's
assets and material resources should all be considered in the decision as
to whether recovery of an overpayment should be waived on the basis
that recovery would be "against equity and good conscience.1 91
Arguably, under the broad criteria established in Groseclose and Quinlivan,
the fault of the Secretary may, without more, render adjustment or recovery of
overpaid benefits against equity and good conscience in some circumstances.
This result may be reached, for example, if the fault of the Secretary is so
egregious in nature that the equities of the case overwhelmingly favor the benefit
recipient. One can expect this issue to reach the courts in the very near future.
In Brown v. Bowen,' 92 Brown argued that the Secretary's claim for
recovery of overpaid benefits was barred by administrative finality, statute of
limitations, and laches. Brown's contention that the claim was barred by
administrative finality was based on Section 404.988(b).' Brown maintained
188. 916 F.2d at 525.
189. S.S.R. 92-5(9) (Cum. Ed. 1992).
190. Id. 20 C.F.R. § 404.508 (1994) was last amended in 1969. The 1990 version of this
regulation is therefore identical to the current version.
191. S.S.R. 92-5(9) (Cum. Ed. 1992).
192. 660 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
193. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(b) (1994) provides that for good cause, a decision may be reopened
within four years after an initial determination is rendered. The 1986 version of this regulation
contained identical language. 20 C.F.R. § 404.989(a) (1994) states that there exists "good cause" to
reopen a prior determination in any of the following circumstances: (a) new and material evidence
is discovered, (b) clerical error in the computation or re-computation of benefits is found, (c)
1079
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
that each benefit check issued to her was an "initial determination" by the
Secretary that she continued to be entitled to benefits. Since the Secretary
initiated the action for recovery more than four years after the dates of such
disbursements, Brown asserted that the Secretary could not reopen these "initial
determinations" and that Section 404.988(b) barred the Secretary's claim.
However, the court was unpersuaded by this novel argument, pointing out that
an initial determination is defined by regulation"9 as a determination by the
Secretary that is subject to administrative and judicial review. 9 The court
found that the determination of overpayment, not the processing and issuance of
the benefit checks, was the "initial determination" subject to administrative or
judicial review under the regulations.'"
The court likewise rejected Brown's second contention that the six year
statute of limitations provided by Section 2415(b) 197 barred recovery and in so
doing, distinguished United States v. Dimeo 98 on two grounds. First, the court
noted that unlike Dimeo, six years had not elapsed between the time the
Secretary became aware of the facts giving rise to the claim and the institution
of the action to recover benefits.'" Second, the court observed that since
Dimeo involved the misapplication of funds by a representative payee, the district
court in that case correctly concluded that the case was controlled by Section
2415(b) as the claim was based upon a "diversion of monies paid under a grant
program."2°° Unlike Dimeo, however, the court pointed out that in the case
subjudice, improper diversion of funds was not the underlying basis of the claim
as the government simply contended that benefits were erroneously paid to
Brown.20 The court noted in this regard that Section 2415(c) specifically
states that "[n]othing herein shall be deemed to limit the time for bringing an
action to establish the title to, or right of possession of, real or personal
property.""2 2 An action to recover overpaid benefits, the court reasoned, is an
evidence of record clearly indicates "on its face" that the decision is erroneous.
194. 20 C.F.R. § 404.902 (1986).
195. 660 F. Supp. at 586.
196. Id.
197. Subject to the provisions of Section 2416 of this title, and except as otherwise
provided by Congress, every action for money damages brought by the United States or
an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon a tort shall be barred unless the
complaint is filed within three years after the right of action first accrues. Provided, that
an action to recover ... for diversion of money paid under a grant program... may be
brought within six years after the right of action accrues....
28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (1988).
198. 371 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
199. 660 F. Supp. at 586. Although not cited by the court, 28 U.S.C. § 2416(c) (1988) does
provide that the limitations periods established by 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1988) shall not commence until
the facts giving rise to the claim are known or could reasonably have been ascertained by the United
States government.
200. 660 F. Supp. at 586.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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action to establish title to and/or possession of personal property. 3 Hence, the
six year statute of limitations provided by Section 2415(b) did not apply.2'
The court then summarily rejected Brown's final contention that the
equitable doctrine of laches barred the claim. Because Brown had acknowledged
fault in causing the overpayment, laches could not apply.2 5 Thus, finding no
legal basis upon which to bar recovery, the court affirmed the Secretary's
determination that Brown was liable for the full amount of the overpayment.2'
In Gerstein v. Bowen, °7 the Secretary initiated payment of retirement
benefits despite denying Gerstein's application for benefits initially in April of
1982 and on reconsideration in November of 1982. Upon discovering this error
in March of 1984, the Secretary terminated benefits and demanded repayment of
overpaid benefits totalling $19,116.80. Gerstein sought review and in June of
1985, an administrative law judge determined that Gerstein had in fact been
retired since January of 1981 thereby extinguishing the Secretary's claim of
overpayment. After the sixty-day period for requesting review had elapsed, the
Secretary through the Appeals Council reopened the administrative law judge's
decision awarding Gerstein retirement benefits and remanded the case for
readjudication. Following remand, a second administrative law judge resurrected
the Secretary's claim of overpayment by finding on October 15, 1986, that
Gerstein had not established entitlement to retirement insurance benefits during
the period at issue.08 Gerstein urged in his appeal of the administrative law
judge's decision that the regulatory provisions governing reopening were only
applicable to claimants. Hence, the Secretary did not have the authority to
reopen the first administrative law judge decision."
While acknowledging its frustration "at trying to interpret a set of regulations
that lend themselves to no rational reading,"21 the district court ultimately
concluded the regulations envision both the claimant and the Secretary exercising
the right to reopen prior determinations.2"' The court then considered the
constitutional challenge to the Secretary's authority to reopen prior determina-
tions because it offends traditional notions of due process to allow the Secretary
to reopen a prior favorable determination years after it is rendered in order to
"disgorge" 'previously paid benefits.2 12  The due process argument against
allowing the Secretary to sua sponte reopen prior determinations, the court noted,
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 660 F. Supp. at 586-87.
206. 660 F. Supp. at 587.
207. 680 F. Supp. 1200 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
208. 680 F. Supp. at 1202.
209. 680 F. Supp. at 1204. 20 C.F.R. § 404.987 (1994) now specifically vests the Secretary with
the authority to reopen prior determinations. 59 Fed. Reg. 8,535 (1994). At the time of this case,
the statute did not vest the Secretary with this authority.
210. 680 F. Supp. at 1207.
211. Id.
212. 680 F. Supp. at 1208.
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is therefore premised on the assumption that it places the benefit recipient in
limbo for at least four years,2 uncertain as to whether or not he should use
benefits received to meet the "necessities of life" or place the funds in escrow
so as to preserve his ability to make restitution in the unfortunate event the
Secretary decides to reopen the claim.2" One might argue, the court observed,
that ownership of benefits under such circumstances is little more than an illusion
or, at best, provisional in nature.2"5 The court pointed out, however, that the
benefit recipient's interest in decisional finality must be balanced against the
interest of the Secretary in revising erroneous determinations to avoid continuing
benefit payments to individuals clearly not entitled to such relief."6 In the end,
the court resolved the issue in favor of the Secretary, finding that the waiver
provisions contained at Subpart F of the Code of Federal Regulations adequately
addressed the constituional concerns. These regulations allow "worthy persons"
to avoid having to reimburse the Secretary for erroneous payments.
The regulations define the terms "fault," "defeat the purposes of this
subchapter," and "against equity and good conscience." This safety
valve measure, when employed judiciously, adequately safeguards a
claimant's interest in finality. If a claimant has acted without fault and
requiring repayment would place the claimant in dire financial straits,
then the claimant will not be required to refund the overpayments. A
claimant who acts properly and needs the social security benefits for
necessary expenses does not have to "put the money in escrow for at
least four years." A claimant simply must avail him or herself of the
waiver procedures. The existence of those procedures satisfies due
process.2"7
In upholding the constitutionality of the Secretary's regulatory authority to
reopen prior determinations, the court refused to follow the First Circuit's
decision in McCuin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services.2 ,8 In McCuin,
the issue was the Secretary's right to sua sponte reopen previous determinations
of Medicare eligibility. In finding against the Secretary, the First Circuit noted
that finality of determinations, as embodied in such doctrines as collateral
estoppel and res judicata, is a basic tenet of our common-law system of
adjudication, applicable as well to "administrative proceedings when an agency
is acting in a judicial capacity. '21 9  The reopening power claimed by the
213. Id. Recall that benefit determinations under Title II of the Act are generally subject to
reopening for a period of four years. See supra note 193.
214. 680 F. Supp. at 1208-09.
215. 680 F. Supp. at 1208.
216. 680 F. Supp. at 1209.
217. 680 F. Supp. at 1209 (citations omitted).
218. 817 F.2d 161 (1st Cir. 1987).
219. 817 F.2d at 172.
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Secretary under 20 C.F.R. Sections 404.987-89,/ the court observed, "takes
away the finality that adjudication normally affords."2' The court further
noted:
No other tribunal would be permitted to announce to a party that it has
made a decision but that it reserves the right to change its mind for a
period of four years. Such a "decision" gives with one hand what it
takes away with the other. In effect, it signifies nothing other than that
a final decision will not occur for at least four years.
tm
The court also found that allowing the Secretary to exercise the privilege of
reopening prior determinations gives rise to serious procedural due process
concerns because of the impossibility of formulating a notice that would
adequately inform a benefit recipient of the multitude of contingencies that attach
once a purportedly favorable determination is made on his claim.22 Given
these significant procedural and substantive due process concerns, the court
concluded:
In view of the serious substantive and procedural due process
problems that would result from the Secretary's reading of the
regulations, we conclude that they should be interpreted as allowing
reopening only on the basis of motions by claimants .... We find that
it would frustrate congressional objectives in passing such a statute [the
Act] if the ambiguity in the regulations were to be resolved in favor of
putting claimants in a state of limbo for at least four years, uncertain of
the final outcome of their cases .... This interpretation results in a
lack of finality and in the issuance of inevitably misleading notices
constructed through selective quotation of ambiguous regulations. This
significantly negates the beneficent purposes of the statute. 4
The Third Circuit has likewise refused to recognize the right of the Secretary
to sua sponte reopen favorable determinations, again citing constitutional due
process concerns. Chrupcala v. Heckler"2 holds that once the district court
remands a partially favorable determination of a claim for Title II disability
insurance benefits pursuant to an appeal filed by a claimant, the Secretary may
not revisit issues not raised by the claimant's appeal if the sixty day period for
requesting review provided by Section 404.969 has elapsed.22 6 In substance,
220. Note that 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987-89 (1994) govern the reopening of retirement, disability,
and medicare claims.
221. 817 F.2d at 172.
222. 817 F.2d at 173.
223. 817 F.2d at 174.
224. Id.
225. 829 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir. 1987).
226. 829 F.2d at 1273. 20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (1994) provides as follows:
Anytime within 60 days after the date of a hearing decision or dismissal, the Appeals
Council itself may decide to review the action that was taken. If the Appeals Council
does review the hearing decision or dismissal, notice of the action will be mailed to all
parties at their last known address.
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the court viewed the Secretary's attempt to revisit the entire case upon remand
as a veiled attempt to reopen the prior determination. 7 Citing the procedural
and substantive due process arguments advanced in McCuin,"8 the court
implicitly agreed with the First Circuit that common-law doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel apply with equal force to administrative proceedings. ' 9
Hence, the Secretary was precluded from revisiting the case once the sixty day
period provided by Section 409.969 had expired.230
To summarize, we now have both the First and Third Circuits refusing to
recognize the Secretary's authority to sua sponte reopen favorable determina-
tions. In each instance, the court cited both procedural and substantive due
process concerns. Surprisingly, none of the other appellate tribunals has had
occasion to consider the constitutional issues raised in McCuin and Chrupcala.
Nevertheless, one must conclude that the Secretary's practice of sua sponte
reopening favorable determinations rests on tenuous ground in these remaining
circuits in view of the well reasoned constitutional arguments advanced in
McCuin and Chrupcala. Of course, the fact that Section 404.987 now
unambiguously states that the Secretary does have sua sponte reopening authority
has little bearing on this issue, considering the constitutional basis of the First
and Third Circuits' refusal to recognize such authority.2"' Furthermore, the
constitutional concerns articulated in McCuin and Chrupcala render this
regulatory change invalid in each of these circuits.
The rationales of McCuin and Chrupcala are correct. The provisional nature
of administrative adjudications established by our current regulatory scheme
simply does not comport with traditional notions of substantive and procedural:
due process. Adherence to a more rigid concept of decisional finality is
imperative. Thus, the Secretary's authority to disturb prior determinations should
be drastically curtailed in keeping with traditional common law notions of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. By no means is it necessary to preserve the
expanded notion of decisional finality perpetuated by the regulations in order to
safeguard the Secretary's legitimate interest in correcting erroneous benefit
determinations. The Secretary's concern for decisional accuracy is adequately
protected by Section 404.969 which, as noted previously, authorizes the Secretary
to institute "on motion review" within sixty days after a decision is rendered.232
227. 829 F.2d at 1273.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 20 C.F.R. § 404.987 (1994).
232. 20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (1994).
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Contrary to the court's assertion in Gerstein, 3 the waiver provisions
contained at Sections 404.506-512 fall woefully short of resolving lingering due
process concerns considering the somewhat narrowly circumscribed class of
benefit recipients to which these regulations apply.2 Most notably, under the
current waiver regulations, individuals who are wholly without fault in causing
an overpayment are not, without more, entitled to waiver of adjustment or
recovery. These individuals are therefore subject to the contingency that the
Secretary may seek to recover benefits paid years after a favorable determination
is made on the claim." Without question, due process concerns are seriously
implicated when the Secretary attempts to recover paid benefits under such
circumstances. The court in Gerstein advanced the notion that the waiver
regulations adequately safeguard the benefit recipients' interest in decisional
finality as these provisions allow "worthy persons" to escape the "long arm" of
the Secretary and thus avoid having to reimburse years of paid benefits."'
How can it be said that a benefit recipient whose conduct did not contribute in
any way to the existence of the overpayment is not a "worthy person" entitled
to the full complement of due process rights and protections? More to the point,
did the Gerstein court have a rational basis to support its conscious decision to
deny the protections of due process to this rather substantial class of good faith
benefit recipients?
One final point is appropriate concerning the analysis in Gerstein of the due
process issues raised by the court's recognition of the Secretary's authority to sua
sponte reopen prior determinations. As noted previously, 7 Gerstein defines
"worthy persons" as individuals entitled to waiver under the applicable regulatory
provisions-i.e., individuals without fault whose circumstances are such that
adjustment or recovery of overpaid benefits would defeat the purposes of the Act
or be against equity and good conscience. Thus, while Gerstein fails to extend
due process protections to all individuals who are free of fault, it does, in all
cases, manifestly deny such protections to those individuals who are at fault.
Does it not seem a bit curious to tie substantive and, indeed, procedural due
process rights to the culpability of the benefit recipient? Does constitutional due
process only extend to "worthy persons"?
In view of the above concerns, regulatory change in this area of the law is
long overdue. The regulations governing reopening must be amended to abolish
the Secretary's right to sua sponte reopen prior determinations. As noted
previously, Section 404.969 preserves the Secretary's interest in decisional
accuracy by providing for a sixty day period within which to reevaluate favorable
233. See supra text accompanying note 217.
234. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.506-512 (1994).
235. Id. See supra note 193.
236. The court in Gerstein defines "worthy persons" as those individuals entitled to waiver of
adjustment or recovery under 20 C.F.R. § 404.506 (1994). See supra text accompanying note 217.
237. See supra text accompanying note 217.
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determinations.2 38 By abolishing the Secretary's right to disturb administrative
determinations after the expiration of this sixty day period, the claimant's interest
in decisional finality will be protected, and the due process concerns articulated
in McCuin and Chrupcala will be laid to rest. Hopefully, some movement in
this direction will be seen in the very near future.
V. CONCLUSION
In Schweikker v. Gray Panthers,239 Justice Powell observed that the Social
Security Act was among the most complex bodies of legislation ever adopted by
Congress, noting that the Act's byzantine construction rendered it virtually
incomprehensible to those untrained in its use.' ° By now, the reader can no
doubt appreciate the wisdom of Justice Powell's comments and has perhaps
concluded that these observations apply with equal if not greater force to the
Secretary's regulations. Unfortunately, however, the many difficult interpretive
questions arising from this highly complex and, at times, unintelligible body of
laws are not the only uncertainties faced by applicants for retirement benefits and
those who endeavor to represent their interests. In the absence of any statutory
or regulatory guidance on this important issue, the courts have adopted two
hopelessly irreconcilable standards for vitiating wage shifting schemes and the
Secretary, curiously enough, has endorsed by ruling each such standard!
The regulations governing the reopening of prior determinations raise still
additional concerns for retirees as these provisions relegate benefit recipients to
provisional entitlement status for a period of up to four years by authorizing the
Secretary to sua sponte reopen favorable determinations during such period for
good cause. Predictably, these provisions have not survived constitutional
scrutiny in two circuits, and when confronted with this issue, most if not all of
the remaining circuits will probably likewise refuse to recognize the Secretary's
reopening authority in light of the substantive and procedural due process
concerns arising from the practice.
To conclude, the reader will likely infer from this article that there exists a
strong undercurrent of uncertainty throughout much of social security retirement
and oveirpayment law. This uncertainty, of course, operates to the detriment of
present and future retirees who have consequently been cast as players in a
multi-million dollar benefit program with no clear set of rules. This being the
case, it is hoped that this article will provide a measure of guidance to the
private practitioner when confronted with questions of retirement or overpayment
law and perhaps serve as the impetus for much needed regulatory change.
238. 20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (1994).
239. 453 U.S. 34, 101 S. Ct. 2633 (1981).
240. Id. at 43, 101 S. Ct. at 2640.
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